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Notes and Comments
TORTS-BATTERY-CONSENT AND PRIVILEGE IN SURGICAL
OPERATIONS-TABOR v. SCOBEE
A doctor, performing an appendectomy to which the patient had
consented, discovered during the course of the operation that, in
addition to acute appendicitis, the patient was also suffering from infected and inflamed Fallopian tubes. The surgeon proceeded to remove the tubes. The patient, a girl of twenty, subsequently sued the
surgeon on the ground that he removed her Fallopian tubes without
her consent and that she had thereby been rendered sterile' and
damaged emotionally, physically, and otherwise. At the trial the plaintiff proved that her stepmother was in the hospital at the time of the
operation and that no effort was made to procure her consent to the
removal of the tubes. 2 On the other hand the doctor's evidence tended
to prove that the tubes, being full of pus, severely swollen, and sealed
at both ends, were so diseased that the woman was in all probability
sterile at the time. Thus the organs were not only dangerously
deleterious to the life and health of the patient because they might at
any time rupture and cause peritonitis and possibly death, but they
were also useless because their functional capacity had been destroyed.
The doctor's evidence further indicated that it was proper medical
practice in this and similar communities to remove Fallopian tubes in
such a diseased condition. Upon conclusion of the evidence the court

instructed the jury:
[T]he defendant, Dr. R. H. Scobee, was expressly authorized to operate on the patient, Macine Tabor, for appendicitis; and
if the jury believes from the evidence that in the course of such
operation that Dr. Scobee discovered that her Fallopian tubes were
in a diseased condition and that in his judgment in the exercise of
ordinary care and skill as defined in these instructions, such conditions if not removed would have endangered plaintiff's life and health;
'The fact, probably quite startling to the average layman, is that women
without either Fallopian tube have given birth to children. "No method of
sterilization upon the human female has stood the test of time; at least occasional
isolated cases of failure have marred the previously perfect record of each." Dippel,
Tubal Sterilization by the Madlener Method, SurGERY, GYNECOLOGY AND OnsTmcs 94 (1940). Also see CROSSEN, DISEASES OF WOMEN 1020 (4th ed. 1947).
The writer is personally acquainted with a case where both Fallopian tubes were
removed and the doctor informed the woman that she would never have children.
A few years later the same doctor delivered a baby for that woman.
'The girl, of course, was not of the age of consent and thus could not have
given consent even had she been conscious. It was not disputed that the stepmother's consent would have been sufficient.
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then Dr. R. H. Scobee was justified in removing the diseased tubes,
even though no expressed consent was obtained or given....

The jury returned a verdict for the doctor, and appeal was made by

the plaintiff on the ground that the instructions were erroneous in
that they allowed the doctor to perform an operation without the
knowledge or consent of the patient or anyone authorized to speak

for her even though no emergency existed. Upon the foregoing facts
the Kentucky Court of Appeals upheld this contention in the recent
3
case of Tabor v. Scobee.
TH LAW

The broad proposition that a surgeon who performs an operation4
without his patient's consent is liable for a battery is well settled.
Contrariwise it is certain that when the surgeon is faced with an
emergency and failure to operate without delay will prove imminently
fatal or seriously detrimental to the health of the patient and consent
is not practicably procurable, he will not be liable for performing the
operation even though he has made an honest error in judgment as
to the proper course to pursue in the emergency. In such an emergency situation the doctor may be considered as privileged.,
A landmark case applying in all its rigor the rule requiring consent
to a surgical operation is that of Mohr v. Williams.. In this case the
patient had consulted the doctor in regard to a difficulty in her right
ear. The ear was examined and an operation advised, to which the
patient consented. When the patient was under anesthetic, the doctor
discovered in her left ear a condition even more serious and demanding
of surgery than the one in her right ear. He operated on her left ear.
She sued for assault and battery and recovered. On appeal the Oklahoma court affirmed. The court said that if the physician in the course
of an operation to which the patient has consented discovers conditions
not anticipated prior to the operation and which, if not removed, will
endanger the life and health of the patient, he will be justified in extending the operation to remove and overcome them though no consent be given.8 However, after stating this "rule", the court said that
this was not such a case, that the diseased condition of the plaintiffs
3254 S.W. 2d 474 (Ky. 1952).
"Wall v. Brim, 138 F. 2d 478 (5th Cir. 1943); Valdez v. Percy, 35 Cal.
App. 2d 485, 96 P. 2d 142 (1939); Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12
(1905).
'Jackovach v. Yocom, 212 Iowa 914, 237 N.W. 444 (1931); Lulca v. Lowrie,
171 Mich. 122, 136 N.W. 1106 (1912).
SPnossEn ON ToRTs 120 (1941).
'95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12 (1905).
8Ibid., 104 N.W. at 15.
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left ear was not discovered in the course of an authorized operation
on the right, but upon an independent examination of that organ
made after the authorized operation was begun. Thus the court
would distinguish between an "independent" operation, as in the case
it had before it, and an "extended" operation, as it would probably
designate the operation in the Scobee case. Is such a distinction
sound? It is submitted that there is no fundamental legal difference
between the situations in so far as the necessity for consent is concerned, and the same principle upon which the requirement of consent is based in the one case supports the requirement in the other.9
However, the difference between a fact situation constituting an "extended" operation and one constituting an "independent" operation
may be important where privilege is involved, as will appear subsequently herein.
The "rule" for cases of "extended" operations suggested by way of
dictum in the Mohr case was later repeated in the case of King v.
Carney10 in an apparent attempt to relieve the rigor of the rule requiring consent. In the Carney case the plaintiff contended that her
directions to the doctor prior to the operation were so limited that he
was only authorized to perform a laceration of the uterus; he in fact
removed her Fallopian tubes. Though the dictum of the Mohr case
was approved in this case, which the court apparently considered an
appropriate case for the rule, the court did not need to invoke the rule.
The narrow holding was that, as a matter of construction, the patient's
directions impliedly authorized the doctor to diagnose her case and
perform whatever operation he might deem necessary after making
an exploratory incision. The implied consent found by the court in
the Carney case was a real consent, i.e., it was actually understood
though not expressly stated that the surgeon should do all that he
deemed necessary to effect the cure.
All the surgical cases use the implied consent terminology. However, whether it is used to mean that there is actual consent implied
though not expressly given as in the Carney case, or whether it is
used to mean that there is such an emergency that consent will be implied though none be given, or whether it is used to cover a situation
in between that of actual consent implied and that of consent implied
from an emergency is often difficult to tell.'1 In the last situation, as
'Wall v. Brim, 138 F. 2d 478 (5th Cir. 1943).
o 85 Okla. 62, 204 P. 270 (1922).
"See Barnett v. Bachrach, 34 A. 2d 626 (1948); Paulsen v. Gunderson, 218
Wis. 578, 260 N.W. 448 (1935); Jackovach v. Yocum, 212 Iowa 914, 237 N.W.
444 (1931); Wells v. Van Nort, 100 Ohio St. 101, 125 N.E. 910 (1919); Luka v.
Lowrie, 171 Mich. 122, 136 N.W. 1106 (1912).
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in the case of emergency privilege, there is, of course, no consent whatever; any consent implied is purely fictional.
The promiscuous use of the term "implied consent" has not only
resulted in ambiguity in the cases but has also left a definite gap in
the law. Express consent, actual consent implied, emergency privilege
-all of these are clearly defenses to an action against the doctor. But
it is earnestly submitted that there is an area where there is no actual
consent, express or implied, nor is there a strict emergency, and yet
wherein the doctor should not be liable for performing a surgical
operation. As previously indicated, many courts may have envisioned
this area when they referred to the defense of implied consent. If so,
then certainly guide posts into the area should be supplied, for it is,
of course, absence of definition which raises the question whether the
courts have recognized any such area at all.
The proposition that a doctor should not be liable for performing a
surgical operation in some situations though there be no actual consent, express or implied, and no emergency, seems to be supported
with some degree of clarity by only one case, that of Bennan v. Parsonnet. 2 The singular lucidity of the court's opinion in that case merits
the somewhat detailed discussion of it that follows.
The plaintiff was an indigent man for whom defendant had gratuitously agreed to repair a rupture on the left side. After the operation
had commenced, the doctor discovered a very serious and dangerous
rupture on the right side, and this he repaired. The trial court charged
the jury that the operation was a legal wrong unless consented to but
that consent might be inferred and that it should be inferred if the condition discovered endangered the plaintiff's life or health. On appeal
from a judgment for the plaintiff it was held that these instructions
substantially embodied the common law rule (Quere: Was the common law rule so broad?) but that this rule had been modified by the
introduction of anesthesia into the practice of surgery. Admittedly the
patient must be the final arbiter of whether he shall undergo the
operation or chance living without it, but under anesthesia the patient
cannot consent at the very time the common law required his consent,
for in the early days of surgery the patient was a conscious participant
in the surgical operation, and as his consent could be obtained, the
rule of the common law was that it must be obtained. Anesthesia has
not only rendered consent during the operation unattainable, it has
made of everyday occurrence surgical operations of a character and
magnitude not dreamed of at the time the common law was in the mak83 N. J. L. 20, 83 Ad. 948 (1912).
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ing and has postponed the complete and final diagnosis formerly made
at a time when the patient could be both informed and consulted.
Then the court says:
By these considerations the scope of modem surgical
operations has been greatly enlarged, and the legal rule applicable
to other
thereto extended beyond the emergencies of actual surgery
matters more or less vitally affecting the patient's welfare.18 [Writer's

italics]

Then the court lays down the rule that where a person has selected

a surgeon to operate upon him and has appointed no other person to
represent him during the period of unconsciousness, the law will by
implication constitute such surgeon the representative of his patient,
and will within the scope of the implication cast upon him the responsibility of so acting in the interest of his patient that the latter shall
receive the full benefit of that professional judgment and skill to
which he is legally entitled. Such implication, says the court, does not
license the surgeon to perform an operation different from that consented to or one involving risks and results of a kind not comtemplated;
but the surgeon, as the implied representative of his patient, can truly
represent him only in so far as he gives to him the benefit of his professional wisdom within the general lines of the curative treatment
agreed upon between them.
Within such general lines, however, much is necessarily
left to the good judgment of the operatingsurgeon, just how much will
depend upon the circumstances of the individual case. ' [Writer's
italics]

In applying these principles to the case before it, the court said that a
ruling that the operation performed was different from the one consented to would be based upon too narrow a view. The plaintiff had
sought correction of a rupture and he is thus presumed to have contemplated all risks incident to an operation for such a condition.
Whether the operation is performed on the right or left side, its

dangers are the same. If the patient had known that at the same
risk and with the same absence of expense he could be relieved of a
condition seriously threatening his life and health, it is inconceivable
that he would not have assented to the operation. Under such circumstances the operation is in no true sense against the will of the patient
nor in a legal sense different in kind from that consented to. The court
concluded:
This concluding suggestion may perhaps be ethical rather
than legal, but it does seem that in good morals a patient ought not,
Ibid., 83 Atl. at 950.
" Ibid.
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in his efforts to obtain a money verdict, be permitted to repudiate
the sound judgment exercised in his behalf by the surgeon of his
choice in whose judgment, had he been capable of being consulted,
he would unquestionably have concurred.'

It is readily perceived that Bennan v. Parsonnet recognizes nonliability where the doctor operates without real consent, express or
implied, and in the absence of an emergency. But this exceptional
non-liability as developed in the case exists only in the narrow fact
situation where the patient has submitted to an operation and has appointed no one to represent him. Although a commendable departure
from existing law, the Bennan case is yet too narrow to satisfy the
exigencies of Twentieth Century medical practice.
The same sound policy considerations underlying the decision help
support, however, the broader rule here proposed. This broader rule
recognizes non-liability in cases beyond the scope of the Bennan case
although the doctor is not attired in the robe of actual consent, express or implied, or emergency privilege.
In the modem practice of medicine the operating physician, exercising his skill and judgment in behalf of one who has committed his
case unto him, should not be placed in the serious and constant
dilemma of deciding at his absolute peril whether that which he thinks
should be done is within the express or implied consent of the patient,
and if not, if it is required by an emergency-decisions which may of
themselves be mountainous but which if wrongly made may conclusively impose liability upon the doctor if he does not delay the operation long enough to consult with one capable of consenting. In such
cases the doctor should be clothed with a privilege of law based upon a
sound public policy adapted to the modem practice of surgery. The
area in which such a privilege exists might well be denominated
"probable consent", for it should exist only where it appears that the
patient would have consented had he been consulted. Admittedly the
probable consent is no consent, a pure fiction, just as is the consent
which is sometimes implied in an emergency. But just as the law
clothes the doctor with privilege in case of an emergency, it should
clothe him with privilege in a case of probable consent, the doctor
having the burden of proving the probable consent as a matter of
defense.
The implied representation concept of the Bennan case is thus replaced by the broader concept of probable consent. However, the
factors gathered from the New Jersey Court's opinion in this case defining the bounds of implied representation are used in ascertaining the
Ibid., 88 At]. at 951.
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existence of probable consent, as will appear subsequently. Thus, not
only from the standpoint of policy considerations but also from the
standpoint of the criteria used in determining whether a particular
case is an exception to the general rule, the Bennan case at least paves
the way for the suggested rule.'0
ThE PhoposED R Ei
An operation cannot be performed without the patient's consent
unless the physician is privileged.
Consent may be either express or implied. Express consent has its
obvious meaning-consent to the particular operation expressly given
to the doctor.
By implied consent is meant not a fictional, non-existing consent,
but a consent to the operation no less real than express consent. Implied consent exists where it is understood, though not expressly
stated, that the doctor shall do whatever he deems necessary to effect
the cure. Whether there is such an understanding is a question for
the jury.
Privilege may exist in either of two cases. First, in the case of an
emergency, i.e., where the patient's condition is critical and the doctor
must act without delay in order to save the patient from death or
serious impairment to health. This situation includes not only an ordinary accident case where one might be unconscious and bleeding to
death, but also a case where the patient is under anesthetic and the
doctor discovers a condition which will result in practically certain
death or serious bodily harm if the doctor does not act now, either because failure to act now will necessitate another operation in the near
future and it is probable that the patient cannot survive the future
operation without death or serious bodily harm, or because the condition will probably deal its damaging blow without warning in the near
future. In determining emergency, the emphasis is placed upon certainty of, not time of, death or serious bodily harm, although the time
would necessarily be fairly proximate. In passing it might be noted
that there has been somewhat of a gap in the law at this point resuiting from an inadequate definition of emergency, the courts apparently having emphasized the time, not the certainty of death, if
the doctor fails to act. As will subsequently appear, the Kentucky
court in the Scobee case was at least approaching the proper emphasis
in instructing that the unauthorized operation might be justified if a
subsequent operation would unduly endanger the patient's life.
10

Also see Barnett v. Bachrach, 84 A. 2d 626 (D. C.-1948).
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Observe that the rule here submitted imposes no condition upon
the doctor's privilege to meet the demands of an emergency in order
to save an unconscious patient. There is no suggestion that he can
operate only if consent is not practicably procurable. Suppose the following: A fifteen year old boy is bleeding to death. An operation
without delay is his only salvation. The doctor and the father stand on
either side of the dying boy. The doctor says: "I must operate." The
father replies: "No, I do not believe in surgery." A bystander rushes
to the nearby courthouse and gets from the judge an order to the
sheriff to protect the doctor in performing the operation. The sheriff
hastens to the scene; the doctor operates; the boy recovers. It is believed that the doctor could not be guilty even of a technical assault.
Surely an overriding public policy would not allow a parent to deny
consent where the child is in a state of strict emergency. It must be
admitted here that the proposition that a parent could not deny consent in the case of a strict emergency has never been recognized by any
court. In fact, the emergency cases always consider the impracticability of procuring consent, thus implying the possibility that it could
be legally denied. But if a court is ever faced with the question, it is
believed that it will reach the result here submitted.
Second, privilege exists where there is probable consent, i.e.,
where the patient has been placed under anesthetic for an operation
to which he has consented, and while under anesthetic the doctor discovers a condition, the removal of which will require an "extended"
or even "different" operation, and to the removal of which the patient
would probably consent at that time and by that doctor if he were
consulted. Whether such a situation exists is a question for the jury
to determine from the circumstances of the particular case.
It may be objected that this rule leaves the patient at the mercy
of the doctor's caprice. Not so. A jury may well believe that the
patient would not have consented to the operation performed at that
moment, that the organ removed was of such a nature that, had he
been consulted, he would have desired to weigh the matter further,
possibly by securing other medical advice, before consenting to its
removal. Or a patient may convince a jury that, had he been informed
of the type of operation needed, he would have wanted some other
surgeon, possibly a specialist, to do the work.
On the other hand it may be argued that this doctrine of probable
consent places an intolerable burden upon the operating physician in
requiring him to prove the highly subjective proposition that the
patient would have consented had he been consulted. It should not
be forgotten that probable consent covers only the situation where
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there is no consent, express or implied, and no emergency, a situation
where in the present state of the law the doctor is conclusively liable,
and a situation in which, if the doctor operates, he ought to be required (and at the same time, allowed) to show that the patient
would have consented. The doctor may convince the jury that he had
been the trusted family doctor for two generations, that the patient
had always relied exclusively upon his medical advice, and that, had
the patient been consulted, consent would have unquestionably been
granted. These suppositions are injected only to show that the rule
is a rule, albeit highly subjective.
The importance of the jury here cannot be over emphasized, and
this body should consider factors such as the following:
1. The urgency of the situation. Great urgency, of course, would
constitute emergency. But when the urgency is something less,
then the degree of urgency in relation to other factors here listed
is an important consideration in determining the existence of probable consent.
2. The type of relief or treatment originally sought. Was the operation which was actually performed the one needed by the patient
to relieve him of the condition which originally prompted him to
seek medical aid? Or was that which was done completely unrelated to the cause of the patient's original complaints? (At least
this one factor probably existed in the Scobee case; i.e., the infected tubes contributed to the abdominal pains prompting plaintiff's solicitation of medical aid.)
3. The similarity between the operation performed and the one consented to. Was the operation performed the same type operation
consented to except on a different side? (The Bennan case.) Or
was the performed operation wholly unlike the one consented to?
(Plaintiff submits to an appendectomy and awakens with an amputated leg.)
4. The risks contemplated in the operation consented to, and the
risks involved in the operation performed. Was the operation consented to only a minor operation with little danger involved,
while that performed was a very dangerous and delicate operation?
5. The results of the operation performed as compared with those
originally contemplated. (The importance of this factor is seen in
the Scobee case: An expected loss of an appendix weighed against
the loss of probability of motherhood.)
6. The relationship of the physician and patient. Had the physician
been the patient's exclusive medical counselor through the years,
or otherwise?
7. The patient's financial condition. Reconsider the Bennan case.
Failure to mend the patient's right rupture probably would not
have been fatal within a few moments after its discovery. Perhaps
it could have been corrected the following week without much
more physical damage being caused by the delay. But had the
doctor not rectified the ominous condition, it would have unleashed its destructive potential in the near future; however, at
this future time the charity patient may have found himself without adequate medical care and in a position peculiar to poverty
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where, although gratuitous service would somewhere be available,
it would not be procured. It is submitted that this patient's case
would more readily be a case of probable consent than would the
case of Henry Ford, Jr., in otherwise similar circumstances. (It
is not intimated that a doctor shall have freer reign with an indigent patient because the law is less protective of the rights of
such a person, but merely that poverty may combine with other
factors to constitute a case of probable consent.)
8. Has the doctor made an incision which will have to be reopened
in the future if the deleterious condition discovered is not now
removed? The question indicates that it may be an important
factor whether the case is one of an "extended" operation or of a
"different" operation, the former more readily being a case of
probable consent.

This list of considerations to be made by the jury is not intended to
be complete, as other factors will arise in other cases. It primarily
reflects the considerations suggested by the cases dealt with herein.
Nor is it intended that this list shall apply in its entirety to all cases.
But the appropriate considerations should be included by the court
in its charge to the jury in each case, the language being adapted to
the facts of the case.
THE ScoBEE CAsE
It is submitted that the decision of the Kentucky Court of Appeals

reversing the judgment of the trial court in the Scobee case was correct.
The opinion of the Court of Appeals stated that the instructions of the
trial court were erroneous for at least three reasons. (1) They authorized the removal of the tubes without considering whether it was
practicable for the surgeon to obtain the stepmother's consent. (2)
They did not impress upon the jury that the emergency must exist
at the time of the operation; rather the jury could reasonably infer
that the diseased tubes would only have to endanger the patient's
health or life sometime in the future. (8) The instructions injected

into the case the negligence concept of ordinary care and skill when
the action did not involve either the professional judgment or surgical

skill of the physician, thus differing from the usual malpractice action.
The court prescribed the following instruction in the event of another trial:
The court instructs the jury that Dr. Scobee was expressly authorized to operate on the plaintiff, Macine Tabor, for appendictis, but that he was not expressly authorized to remove her
Fallopian tubes and you shall find for the plaintiff, Macine Tabor, for
the unauthorized removal of her Fallopian tubes under Instruction
'B1 7 unless you believe from the evidence that their condition was
such that it would have endangered her life to have let them stay in
either because they might immediately have ruptured or because a
separate or later operation for their removal might unduly have en'1 Instruction B related to damages.
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dangered her life or her health and it was impracticable at the time
for Dr. Scobee to obtain the consent of either Macine Tabor or her
stepmother, Mrs. Tabor, before the removal of the tubes, in which
event you will find for the defendant, Dr. Scobee.u (Writer's footnote 17.)

Manifestly these instructions are a grand step in the right direction
by the Kentucky Court, and they define the position of this court with
far more exactitude than is found in the opinions of other courts. The
instructions, however, may be criticized in two respects.
First, under these instructions even if there was a strict emergency
the doctor could not operate without the stepmother's consent if such
could be practicably procured. It is vigorously urged that no consent
or no effort to obtain consent should be necessary in the case of strict
emergency even if the stepmother were standing right beside the doctor. This is but another way of saying that, for reasons previously
stated, the stepmother could not lawfully deny consent in such a case,
although admittedly no cases in point have been found.
A second criticism is found in the court's reference to a later
operation "unduly" endangering the patient's life or health. The court
may mean that a later operation, a later reopening of the plaintiff's
abdomen, will probably cause death or serious bodily harm. If this
is what the court means by undue danger, then it is earnestly urged
that the doctor, faced with a situation where his failure to act now
will unduly endanger the patient's life or his health, is faced with a
strict emergency in the same sense and as surely as where failure to
act will result in immediate death or immediate serious bodily harm.
In this situation it would surely be the certainty of death or serious
bodily harm by failure to act now, not the time of death or serious
bodily harm, that would determine the existence of an emergency.
Again, no consent and no effort to obtain consent would be necessary.
(It should be noted here that the instruction makes no provision for
the possibility that, if the doctor does not act now, the tubes will burst
without warning and cause death or serious bodily harm in the near
future, this situation also being one of real emergency, as previously
indicated, and one which should be covered by the instructions.)
However, when the court speaks of a later operation "unduly" endangering the patient's life or health, it may mean something less
than the situation of emergency described above. It may mean that
the future operation would be serious, that there would be some possibility-far short of probability-that the future operation would cause
death or serious bodily harm, but a great probability that it would
' Tabor v. Scobee, 254 S.W. 2d 474 (Ky. 1952).
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not. If this is what the court means by undue danger, then it is submitted that the doctor could not have legally operated on the patient
regardless of how impracticably procurable was the stepmother's consent unless the situation was one of probable consent, for this would
be the very type of situation in which the patient or one standing in
loco parentis would have the right to determine whether she should
chance living without the operation. But under the court's instructions
with this meaning ascribed to the "undue danger" phraseology, the
doctor might legally operate when he should not be allowed to operate
unless there is probable consent.
At this point a very serious question might be raised. Conceding
the soundness of the proposed doctrine of probable consent, would
the doctrine be applicable to a case involving a minor, such as the
Scobee case? A reason for the policy of the Bennan case, upon which
the doctrine of probable consent is largely based, was that the patient
was under anesthetic and could not consent. Therefore, where the
patient is a minor and the consent of a parent or one standing in loco
parentis can be practicably procured, one of the reasons for the rule
no longer exists. (Obviously if such consent could not be practicably
procured, the same reasons invoking the probable consent rule in other
cases would exist.) As previously indicated, it is not intended that the
rule of probable consent be limited only to cases where consent cannot be procured, but that the doctor, who has given the patient the
benefit of his best skill and judgment be allowed in any case to set up
as a defense that the patient would have consented had he been consulted. Operations must go on. Doctors can scarcely pause in the
middle of surgery to go on a fishing expedition to find consent for
that which they honestly believe should be done. It is reiterated that
the burden of proof is on the doctor. Thus for his own safety the
doctor will find it highly desirable to obtain consent; nevertheless, if
in the exercise of honest judgment he proceeds without consent, he will
not be conclusively liable.
It is believed that the rule proposed in this note is the only one
that contains the correct concepts for a case such as the Scobee case,
and that these principles should be presented in full to the jury as
concisely as possible, though admittedly the tersest charge may be
somewhat lengthy. If under such instructions the jury should.find in
a case like the Scobee case no actual consent, express or implied, and
no emergency (and it is not suggested that it could not find an emergency), then it could well be that one consideration alone would convince the jury that there was also no probable consent as defined in
the instructions, viz., that a woman who had expressly consented to a
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removal of her appendix awakened from anesthesia to discover the
horrible fact that her Fallopian tubes were gone. With this fact before it, the jury might believe that, had the woman's stepmother been
consulted, she would not have consented to the removal of the
Fallopian tubes at that time by that doctor, that she would have desired further medical consultation, possibly with a specialist, before
accepting the fact that the tubes could not be saved. Certainly probable consent would be difficult to prove in a case like this. Still the
doctor is entitled to the instruction, as he would be in a closer case,
such as the Bennan case.
RECAPITULATION

The primary purpose of this note has been to emphasize the need
for a new and defined area in the surgical operations cases, that area
being here denominated "probable consent." However, two other important proposals are incidentally made. First, that the courts should
define emergency cases so as to emphasize the certainty and not the
time of death or serious bodily ham should the doctor fail to operate.
Second, that the courts no longer imply that consent of a parent is
necessary before operating on a child in a case of strict emergency if
it is practicably procurable, it being unjust to suggest that consent
could be denied in such a case.
The reader may have inferred that the whole purpose and effect
of this note is to give the doctor greater immunity from liability when
he decides to swing his scalpel. On the contrary, the writer feels that
the surgeon is notoriously able to bear any financial loss which he
might suffer by reason of the present rule. However, the patients
would be the ultimate beneficiaries of the rules here advanced, for
under these rules they are more nearly assured of maximum surgical
skill.
WIIAM A. RicE

CONTRACTS-FORBEARANCE OF SUIT AS SUFFICIENT
CONSIDERATION
Consideration as a requisite for the enforceability of a promise'
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